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ABSTRACT 
The admissions of the survey respondents to this thesis demonstrate that there is a 
problem with the implementation of the National Incident Management System in both 
large and small law-enforcement agencies in the state of Wisconsin.  NIMS training is a 
perishable skill, and without constant refreshment—either through regular practice or 
actual use—this system cannot be sustained within an organization.  There is a flaw 
either within the training, in the implementation of the training, or in the system itself. 
So, what are the barriers to Wisconsin law-enforcement agencies adopting and routinely 
using NIMS, and how can those barriers be reduced?  To gather data on the barriers that 
Wisconsin law-enforcement agencies encounter using NIMS, an electronic survey was 
developed.  Approximately 550 law-enforcement agencies within Wisconsin were 
queried in the survey with a very low 12% response rate. Sixty-six percent of the 
respondents reported that, while they may be in compliance with federal NIMS 
requirements, they are not proficient.  Recommendations include promoting a culture of 
customization of NIMS, creation of a small agency version of NIMS, and conducting a 
program evaluation of NIMS that includes the creation of objective NIMS proficiency 
standards through output/performance measurement and tying future funding incentives 
to those objective standards.  
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
It is difficult to accurately measure the present functionality of the National 
Incident Management System, or NIMS, in Wisconsin. One available set of statistics 
provides some insight: the Wisconsin Preparedness Plan produced in 2007 by the Office 
of Justice Assistance indicates that Wisconsin is committed to training in the National 
Incident Management System. The Wisconsin plan states, “Wisconsin is served by more 
than 2,330 emergency response agencies including 650 law enforcement agencies. The 
state will continue to make training and exercising of emergency responders a priority, 
providing support to train 4,000 responders and support 65 all-hazards exercises in the 
next year” (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 3). The state’s training in 
this case includes all emergency responders, not just law enforcement, but one could infer 
from these numbers that there is wide acceptance of NIMS.  
Despite regularly funded NIMS training, the survey results reported in this thesis 
demonstrate that there is a problem with the proficiency of Wisconsin law enforcement 
agencies regarding NIMS and incident command. The northern communities of the state 
have recently experienced high-casualty active-shooter incidents, and the city of Oak 
Creek has experienced an active shooter using an Uzi submachine gun within a local 
hotel, again with high casualties. These are dangerously fluid incidents that involve 
offenders with military or law enforcement training. While there is no question that 
agencies respond to the best of their abilities, the coordination and response required to 
resolve aggressive actions against citizens and public safety must be trained and practiced 
beyond the normal functional abilities of the law enforcement community. Incidents of 
this type require incident command structure with the establishment of safety officers, 
incident action, and safety plans.  
Senior law enforcement and community leaders may not be totally informed of 
the functional command and control abilities within their organizations. Johnnie Smith, 
Administrator for Wisconsin Emergency Management, reported, “Keeping issues from 
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the scrutiny of outsiders and senior leadership maintain what one senior state leader has 
described as a façade. Therefore, while the status quo in terms of homeland security 
appears adequate and functional, based on organizational structure and processes, it is 
also, based on reasoned evaluation, a candidate for collapse in the face of a catastrophic 
disaster” (Smith, 2007, p. 60). This statement indicates a gap between an agency’s 
perceived and actual functional ability. 
An example of conflicting signals regarding training and practice comes directly 
from the training section of the state of Wisconsin’s Emergency Management Division, 
which has provided training in incident command system principles for over fifteen 
years. One supervisor reports that there are inconsistent levels of commitment and 
institutionalization of this system from state agencies down to small jurisdictions within 
the Wisconsin law enforcement community (Jerry Haberl, personal communication, 
August 5, 2008). There has been a significant commitment to training hundreds of law 
enforcement commanders, and yet the training section supervisor has determined that the 
practice of NIMS has not been embraced within some large and small organizations. 
Trainers, police chiefs, and emergency managers attribute a wide range of factors 
to the variance in NIMS implementation: lack of funding, inadequate staffing, competing 
priorities, lack of commitment by local government and law enforcement leadership, and 
the inability to turn NIMS theory into practice. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The admissions of the survey respondents to this thesis demonstrate that there is a 
problem with the implementation of NIMS in both large and small law enforcement 
agencies in the state of Wisconsin. NIMS training is a perishable skill, and without 
constant refreshment—either through regular practice or actual use—this system cannot 
be sustained within an organization. There is a flaw either within the training, in the 
implementation of the training, or in the system itself. The consequences are unsafely 




employees and citizens. The inability to effectively mitigate incidents in a timely manner, 
causing unnecessary financial loss or impacts upon the environment, is also a probable 
consequence stemming from this problem.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the barriers to Wisconsin law enforcement agencies adopting and 
routinely using NIMS, and how can those barriers be reduced? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will serve to summarize the significant authoritative documents 
impacting the scope of the NIMS project nationally and within Wisconsin. There appears 
to be little published examination of the root causes for difficulties in sustainment of 
NIMS. This thesis may be useful to other states that almost certainly are experiencing the 
same concerns as Wisconsin. 
Immediate consumers are the leaders and trainers of the Wisconsin law 
enforcement community, Wisconsin emergency-management community, and local, 
county, and state government leaders. 
Secondary consumers include the Governor’s Homeland Security Council, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National NIMS Coordination effort, 
along with the National Emergency Management Association and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wisconsin instituted a NIMS Advisory Council in March 2006 to act as a conduit 
for the variety of disciplines impacted by the presidential directive to adopt NIMS. 
Through this committee interaction, members have become exposed to an array of 
concerns from agencies struggling with NIMS. Some recurring themes are home rule 
doctrine, lack of organizational leadership authority, lack of adequate professional 
standards, and poor fit in organizations of fewer than 50 officers. 
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There is little documented research on NIMS obstacles but FEMA has recently 
asked the states to identify barriers in obtaining NIMS compliance. One source is the 
National Emergency Management Association. It was asked in the fall of 2008 by FEMA 
to compile remarks regarding barriers to NIMS compliance from their state members. 
One recurring theme was the inflexibility of standardized NIMS requirements.  
There are several documents, both federal and state, establishing NIMS. The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security 2002 and 2007 and Presidential Directives #5 
and #8 mandate NIMS as the national system of incident management. The method of 
gaining compliance has been spelled out in the NIMS Compliance Assistance Support 
Tool (NIMSCAST) Web site; the foundation is clear and the documents provide adequate 
guidance. There is commonsense reasoning behind this direction. But for some it is not 
compelling enough to prioritize NIMS adoption.  
Direction at the state level is from the Governor of Wisconsin who has issued 
Executive Order #81 that designates NIMS as the basis of incident management in 
Wisconsin. Incident command, an essential element of NIMS, is also mandated by 
Wisconsin statute as well. Wisc. Stat. 166.03(2)(a)2 requires that ICS be used at least 
during declared emergencies by all emergency response agencies.  
The lack of sufficient collaboration or a regional approach may be a contributing 
reason for failure to assimilate NIMS. An understanding of what it takes to effectively 
work in close collaboration, the kind that is essential within an expanding ICS structure, 
may lead to improvement. One source, “Building Collaborative Capacity,” written by 
Erik Jansen, Susan Hocevar, and Gail Thomas of the Naval Postgraduate School, has 
created a table of success factors in developing interagency collaboration. The primary 
factor identified by the respondents was an overwhelming need or “feeling a need to 
collaborate” (Jansen, Hocevar, & Thomas, 2004, p. 14). Establishing a collaborative 
environment may then hinge on selecting those individuals or leaders with a mindset of 
seeking a team approach to problem solving. 
One leading Wisconsin discipline for collaboration and the use of incident 
command is the fire service. Its recently developed mutual aid group is known as the 
 5
Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) of Wisconsin. A central guideline relies on 
credentialing personnel and developing a matrix for expanding response (Mutual Aid 
Box Alarm System, 2008). This matrix may have benefits as a model for law 
enforcement to follow in formulating a system of quick access to mutual-aid partners. 
There is no doubt that NIMS skills are perishable. A study of the “Lesson Learned 
Information Sharing” Web site at www.llis.gov, which contains after-action reports 
available from across the country, identifies performance shortcomings within law 
enforcement in both real and simulated training events. These documented performance 
issues also provide potential solutions or action plans that can be studied to provide 
points of discussion and recommendations for Wisconsin law enforcement agencies 
struggling with the complex system. 
A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS by Buck, 
Trainor, & Aguirre (2006) provides a background from several sources on understanding 
the strengths and weaknesses of ICS, how it initially pertained to the fire service, 
fundamental ICS issues with other disciplines, and views regarding the sustainability of 
NIMS. There is a confirmation in this reading of the sense that ICS is a good method, but 
if not practiced it cannot be successful. It also points out poor examples of ICS use, 
particularly in incidents of wide spatial range. Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre relate that after 
the Columbia space shuttle accident, it was impossible to establish a perimeter control (p. 
9). It took on the look of a mass assault incident in which incident command was used by 
specific agencies but was not initially implemented. Perhaps one of the most important 
lessons from this incident is that it created unique demands for which available ICS 
procedures did not apply in their entirety, so that it called forth many forms of social and 
cultural emergence.  
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II—Methodology: A report of the demographics of Wisconsin law 
enforcement organizations, the survey method utilized, and the outcome of the survey 
including notable narrative responses. 
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Chapter III—Analysis: An analysis of the quantitative results obtained from the 
research effort. Several barriers to NIMS implementation and the reasons behind those 
gaps are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter IV—Conclusions and Recommendations: Conclusions are broken out and 
ideas for specific stakeholders are provided. The recommendations include  
1. Maintaining the status quo 
a. Conduct a local risk analysis 
2. Customization of NIMS 
 a. Creation of a small agency version of NIMS 
  b. Local modification of NIMS 
  c. Enhancement of regional incident management teams 
  d. Creation of a smart practices forum for NIMS customization 
3. Resource allocation 
 a. Regional expansion of the SMART concept. 
4. Program evaluation 
 a. Third-party program evaluation of NIMS 
b. Creation and voluntary implementation of objective NIMS 
proficiency standards through output/performance measurement 
c. Funding of incentives tied to objective standards 
G. HYPOTHESIS 
There is an established need to exercise a reliable system of command and control 
at critical incident scenes. A significant number of Wisconsin law enforcement 
supervisors have received basic and advanced training in NIMS, but some agencies have 
not been able to implement it well, and others have opted out of NIMS training 
altogether. 
Some of the reasons that agencies opt out or are compliant but not proficient with 
NIMS include a lack of organizational commitment; the impact of the home-rule 
doctrine; the lack of adequate personnel to staff such an effort; the complexity of the 
system and its use in the field; NIMS is not compatible with the activities of all agencies;  
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the time commitment for training and its effective delivery; the inadequacy of proficiency 
measurements; the overall cost of commitment; and the difficulty in both initial 
implementation and ongoing sustainment. 
A report by the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau contains some 
documentation of law enforcement performance with NIMS, specifically incident 
command. In a survey conducted in November 2006 of the 72 county emergency-
management units regarding their activities, only half the counties responded; of those 
respondents, one half of the counties had “unanticipated problems in responding to recent 
emergencies, including that municipalities were not sufficiently prepared for an 
emergency” (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2006, p. 3). Why did only half the 
counties respond? Perhaps there is no penalty or incentive to cooperate. There is no 
authority mandating accurate reporting. Perhaps due to apathy. More telling is that those 
agencies that did respond, reported a significant number of problems in performance.  
Jerry Haberl, the facilitator of the Wisconsin NIMS Advisory Council, suspects 
that a substantial number of agencies within the state have decided against accepting 
preparedness assistance (personal communication, August 5, 2008). He attributes this 
lack of commitment to several factors, including the lack of local match funding, lack of 
allocated time for training and planning in emergency management, and homeland 
security issues. There is no strong desire to develop meaningful and practiced 
emergency-operations plans. It may be that, in the several years since 9/11, citizens and 
local governments have been losing momentum in the area of homeland security efforts. 
Chris Bellavita addresses this phenomenon in his theory of the issue attention cycle, 
stating: “We are far removed from 9/11 and quite frankly there is that 90% of adults that 
think that terrorism is not too likely” (Bellavita, 2005, p. 4). 
Some leadership from agencies of fewer than 25 officers report that at no time in 
their tenure have they encountered significant incidents that would have required the need 
for an expanded incident command structure. Why, then, should they allocate the time 
and personnel required to institute NIMS? Unfortunately, in June of 2008, an 
unprecedented 32 counties within Wisconsin suffered the worst flooding in the state’s 
history. A presidential declaration of emergency was secured and FEMA responded with 
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funding. FEMA requires a NIMS-structured response, and there were many agencies that 
were unprepared for the FEMA-structured reporting system. The utilization of the 
incident command system is required to coordinate command and control. This is a 
perfect example that leaders, especially law enforcement leaders, should consider and 
prepare for the high-risk, low-frequency events. Some leaders as indicated in the survey 
do not embrace the idea that NIMS, as a terrorist attack is improbable in rural Wisconsin 
communities but there is little appreciation that NIMS is much more apt to be used in 
local response of natural disasters.  
Although the literature indicates a number of impediments to the adoption and use 
of NIMS, it does not explain the root causes or potential solutions to these problems. For 
this reason a survey instrument was developed to directly engage the law enforcement 
community in Wisconsin.  
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II. METHODOLOGY 
To gather data on the barriers that Wisconsin law enforcement agencies encounter 
in adopting and routinely using NIMS, an electronic survey was developed. Its focus was 
on NIMS mandates, Wisconsin’s efforts towards compliance, and the evaluation of 
NIMS. The goal of the research was to collect data to determine actual compliance rates, 
identify reasons for non-compliance, and generate possible solutions or improvements. 
A. WHY A SURVEY? 
A survey was used to draw information directly from agency administrators that 
would debunk or reinforce the theory that Wisconsin law enforcement is not proficient in 
NIMS. The indications are that NIMS implementation as mandated by the federal 
government is relatively high, but those numbers do not equate to expertise in incident 
command or adequate preparedness within NIMS. An additional goal of the survey was 
to elicit both smart practices and lessons learned that could eventually be shared with 
those interested in the process but struggling with it. The hope was that if a law 
enforcement partner asked the questions that allowed for a confidential narrative 
response, senior members would use the opportunity to fully divulge their concerns.  
Gathering documentation through a survey can be a powerful influence for 
change. It was expected that the results would confirm that a wide variety of issues exists. 
These findings would then be used to promote a more comprehensive program evaluation 
and to develop recommendations for streamlining or customizing NIMS. 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS OF WISCONSIN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The Wisconsin Department of Justice Training and Standards Bureau reports that 
there are approximately 550 law enforcement agencies within Wisconsin. As is the case 
in most states, most of the departments are small: 320 agencies (58%) have fewer than 
ten officers; another 102 agencies (an additional 20%) have fewer than 25 officers. 
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All departments within the state were asked to respond. A sufficient number of 
responses from small and medium-sized police departments and sheriff’s departments 
were received, but there were few responses by the largest departments within the state, 
which resulted in a gap in the total survey value.  
Below are two charts that reflect the make-up of law enforcement organizations 
(LEO) in the state of Wisconsin. These charts visually confirm that 58% of the agencies 
number fewer than 25 in staffing. This could be a central reason that law enforcement is 
struggling with NIMS in Wisconsin. NIMS and the command and control component 
require sufficient resources to fill out the structure needed in incident command. With a 





# of primary officers in 
Wisconsin 
# of Wisconsin agencies 
 500+ 2 
 400-499 3 
 300-399 0 
 200-299 3 
 100-199 13 
 75-99 16 
 50-74 24 
 25-49 64 
 15-24 65 
 10-14 47 
 5-10 140 
 1-5 180 
  
Table 1.   Number of Wisconsin agencies by number of sworn officers. Courtesy of 
Richard P. Williams, Operations Program Associate, Wisconsin 
Department of Justice Training and Standards Bureau. 
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Figure 1.   Agencies by Number of Active, Primary LEOs. Courtesy of Richard P. 
Williams, Operations Program Associate, Wisconsin Department of 
Justice Training and Standards Bureau. 
C. SAMPLE SELECTION 
Members of the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Associations and the Badger Sheriffs 
Association were solicited as survey respondents. An e-mail was sent to the board of 
directors of the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association and to the president of the Badger 
Sheriffs Association requesting that each organization forward the survey Web site. A 
further request was made that each organization provide an introductory message of 
support and encourage its members to participate in the survey. To ensure that the most 
knowledgeable individuals were queried, law enforcement executives were requested to 
forward the survey to those in their organizations with the most interest or information 
about possible agency barriers to compliance. It was important to elicit responses from 
those who had primary responsibility for training, implementation, policy development, 
and the evaluation of NIMS.  
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D. SURVEY QUESTION METHODOLOGY 
The survey opened with preliminary questions about the size of the agency and 
the respondent’s rank. A key question then followed that, depending upon the answer, 
directed the respondent to one of three sets of additional questions: 
Rate your organization’s commitment to NIMS compliance. (Depending on the 
response to this question, you will be forwarded to a set of questions specific to your 
agency’s situation.) 
1. No formal organizational commitment to the NIMS initiative. 
2. NIMS compliant but perhaps not proficient with NIMS practices. 
3. NIMS compliant and have integrated NIMS well into the organization. 
For those agencies that had opted out of NIMS, the follow-up questions were 
structured to establish why. 
1. What needs to be changed within NIMS itself? 
2. What would need to be changed with the way NIMS is trained? 
3. What would need to be changed within your agency or its mission? 
For those agencies that are NIMS compliant but perhaps not proficient, and for 
those that have successfully integrated the program into their organization, expanded 
answers were sought regarding the process by which the department had accomplished 
this implementation.  
1. How often do you train? 
2. How have you incorporated NIMS into your daily operations? 
3. Have you used NIMS in medium and large-scale events? 
4. Have you established a unified NIMS program within all local government 
agencies? 
5. What recommendations would you have for those pursuing NIMS now? 
6. What challenges did you have to overcome in order to apply the theory 
and turn it into practice? 
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7. What tools (procedures, practices, technology, and equipment) did your 
agency introduce to supplement the implementation? 
8. Do you measure your agency’s competencies in NIMS? 
9. Is there any other pertinent information based on your experiences with 
NIMS?  
E. SURVEY RESPONSE RATES 
Six responses acknowledged no formal commitment to NIMS. Seventeen 
responses reported that the agency is NIMS compliant and has integrated the system into 
its organization. Forty-four respondents (or 65.7% of the respondents) indicated that 
although their agency is NIMS compliant, it is not proficient with NIMS practices. It was 
not surprising that almost 66% of the agencies were not proficient; this confirms that law 
enforcement struggles with NIMS. 
Several observations regarding the response level were revealing. Of 550 
potential respondents only 67 (12%) answered the survey. While there was an 
expectation that many would opt out of answering the narrative questions, this lack of 
involvement was surprising and disappointing.  
The response to the survey reflected fewer participants than expected and spoke 
volumes about the state of NIMS within Wisconsin law enforcement. Ken Hammond, 
director of the Wisconsin Department of Justice Training and Standards Bureau, reported 
that his organization commonly uses surveys to obtain program guidance. The Training 
and Standards Bureau’s experience with response rates from Wisconsin law enforcement 
has been as high as 60% and as low as 20%, depending on the survey. Mr. Hammond 
reported that if the respondent has an interest in the subject, he usually takes the time to 
assist in the research (personal communication, September 2, 2008). An overall response 
rate of 12% suggests that there is little interest in NIMS-related issues.  
F. RESPONSE OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS 
Among those responding agencies that have opted out of NIMS, a few short 
narrative responses were received from agencies with staffs of fewer than 10. The main 
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message received was that NIMS is not worth the time or personnel cost that the concept 
entails. The number of responses collected in this line of questioning was very small, 
however, and any conclusions therefrom should be considered unconfirmed. 
Responding agencies that have integrated NIMS into their organizations were 
generally positive in their reports. Somewhat surprisingly, these organizations generally 
only train on a yearly basis. Most of them use the incident command portion when needs 
arise in critical incidents; they support its use by specialty teams; and they have not 
incorporated it into daily operational response. Most supervisors have discretion 
regarding when to implement incident command. A majority of agencies with more than 
25 members have experienced larger-scale incidents where NIMS, and more specifically 
incident command, were utilized; these agencies were pleased with the outcome of the 
event. A great majority of organizations with staff numbering 25 or more also has a 
satisfactory working emergency-management cooperation with other units within their 
government. Somewhat unexpectedly, most agencies have been using NIMS for only 
three years or less. Some report that there was an initial push towards incident command 
after 9/11. Some of those had slipped in commitment since, and it has only been because 
of the recent NIMS compliance mandate that they have become involved with incident 
command again.  
A variety of suggestions were received regarding changes that should occur in the 
system itself. Recommendations were consistent with what the Wisconsin NIMS 
Advisory Council and National Emergency Managers Association have been hearing in 
the last 18 months. Most local governmental entities gather their measurement of NIMS 
proficiency through performance observed or reported through after-action reports. Few 
new barriers were identified. Most of the data received was a reaffirmation of previously 
communicated concerns to either county and state emergency-management or FEMA 
officials.  
The respondents who were compliant but perhaps not proficient with NIMS 
practices generally provided the same type of responses as those who consider 
themselves successful in implementation. As anticipated, this category did identify 
problems with ongoing training, ability to initiate effective policy changes, and problems 
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with incorporating ICS into daily operations. Surprisingly, a large number have not had 
any occasion to actually use NIMS in a medium- or large-scale event. At least half these 
organizations have no established emergency-management interaction with other internal 
departments. Some have shared policies but do not practice together or have significant 
interaction regarding these procedures. The average experience of the compliant but not 
proficient group with NIMS is three years or less and is similar to those that are 
proficient.  
The most helpful contributions from this category of respondents concerned 
recommendations to other organizations in the process of implementing NIMS and 
revealed that for a variety of reasons there was a lack of agency commitment to either 
initial or ongoing training.  
G. NOTABLE RESPONSES 
1. Those Opting Out of NIMS 
Within the group that opted out of NIMS, respondent #3 commented, “How 
would NIMS increase daily efficiency for a two-man department vs. the time spent on 
up-keep of records?”∗ Respondent #4 shared, “Where do you find money to practice the 
objectives and command systems?”  
There were operational-level opinions that NIMS would not enhance the overall 
daily response. These agencies have received training in incident command but have no 
intention to commit to the larger NIMS program. This small group concentrated on 
command and control in their responses but did not mention NIMS concepts of 
preparedness and recovery efforts. 
 
                                                 ∗ Those respondents to the survey who wished to remain anonymous are identified in this thesis by 
number; respondents who agreed to disclosure of their identities are named. 
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2. Those Successful at Implementing NIMS 
Those respondents whose agencies were successfully implementing NIMS 
thought that NIMS needed less repetition and more real-time scenarios. Respondent #39, 
a sheriff and emergency-management director, stated that NIMS needs to “recognize that 
one size does not fit all departments.” 
One successful department feels that to secure the commitment of more 
departments to NIMS, employees need to have a better understanding of the benefits of 
the system. Lt. Halverson of the Brown Deer Police suggests, “If NIMS/ICS is to 
continue to be successful, funding needs to continually be made [available] for training 
and equipment updates. The NIMS requirements are such that maintenance of the 
program to be compliant can sometimes exceed agency budgets.” 
Chief Dams of the Greendale Police Department has worked hard with his fire 
counterpart to create an atmosphere of collaboration. He suggests that perhaps change is 
difficult for some: “Old habits die hard—police agencies working with fire agencies takes 
work. We [police and fire] both have different views on how to manage incidents.” 
The most value-laden narratives from those that have successfully implemented 
NIMS came in the area of those recommendations that they would make for others 
working towards compliance. Chief Alloy of the Brillion Police replied, “Get compliant 
and stay compliant with regular training, as it is the best training available to combine 
resources in the event of an emergency.”  
Regarding compliance, Lt. Halverson asserted, “Have all of the officers attend the 
classes and not train them with the on-line course. Make sure you have a mechanism in 
place to review compliance status on a regular basis.”  
Sergeant Mahoney of the Dane County Sheriff Department recommended reliance 
on the smart practices of other agencies: “Develop a database of examples from other 
agencies of what they have used and worked that would be similar to their agency.”  
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Chief King of the Prairie du Chien Police Department stated, “Take it seriously, 
suffer through the repetition, and get it done. At some point, you will be glad that you 
did.”  
3. NIMS Compliant but Not Proficient 
Respondent #6, from among those agencies that are compliant but not proficient, 
reported that the agency trains “as needed only to keep the department certified to accept 
federal grants.” Incorporating ICS into daily operations, respondent #73, with a staff of 
more than 100, mandates ICS “whenever an incident involves more than four personnel 
to a scene.”  
A variety of agencies have instituted the appropriate policy and procedures but 
use the policy as a guideline only. Respondent #60 stated that his agency “encourage[s] 
their supervisors to employ the procedure whenever they can.” 
Recommendations for others struggling with the process came from respondent 
#73: “Coordinate training with agencies that have established NIMS. Have a core group 
of NIMS-proficient personnel to ensure NIMS compliance in the event of a major 
incident.”  
Chief Boyes of the East Troy Police noted, “Lobby Washington to make NIMS 
more realistic for law enforcement. NIMS is not designed for smaller agencies.” 
Respondent #3 said, “You need to have strong support from your council and other city 
staff to be committed to it.” Sheriff Nehls of Dodge County recommended, “Buy into it 
now, it is here, start the classes and start integrating it into our department, 
institutionalize it.” 
Many believe that changes are needed within NIMS itself. Chief Boyes stated, 
“The way NIMS is presented is a problem. It works for fire, but police are not fire. We 
don’t respond with the same number of officers per call as a fire agency does. NIMS 
needs to figure out how to make it work for smaller agencies.”  
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One chief stated that training should be concentrated on local response: “Don’t 
stress the national chain of command as much. Local municipalities will not be involved. 
County and State Emergency Government will.”  
Director Morris of the Stevens Point Police addressed a concern with common 
language: “Do we possibly make it less acronym driven? I don’t know but it does not 
come as a natural fit for law enforcement. However, I’m not sure that it is not law 
enforcement rather than NIMS that needs to change.”  
Other comments included the opinion that taking tests is useless and inefficient. 
Respondent #48 believes that “police professionals must practice incident command with 
day to day operations for the system to be effective when a large scale incident occurs.”  
The recommendations regarding changes that should occur within agencies 
ranged from maintaining the status quo to taking an honest introspective look at the 
agency itself. Director Morris stated, “Probably the discipline to utilize the system 
whenever an incident involves more than two officers and to follow the book for setting 
up and following the process, we need to conform not just in practice but in fact.” 
 Respondent #12 was straightforward regarding the first year of implementation: 
“This concept is ludicrous and betrays the mindset of those administering NIMS. We 
know the procedures. We know what to do. There is nothing to ‘sustain.’ This is not a 
religion.”  
Respondent #3 struggled with maintaining training under the system since “it’s 
always an effort to maintain something that is rarely used. We are currently in the process 
of requiring our officers to do on-line training.”  
Challenges still to be overcome according to Sheriff Nehls include “gaining 
employee interest and identifying the benefits and never saying we won’t need it because 
nothing will happen here.”  
Chief Wierzba of the Plover Police Department identified the complexity of the 
system as an issue of “getting officers/personnel trained and then understanding concepts 
beyond the language/definitions of a large bureaucracy.” 
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Measuring performance is difficult. Respondent #52 stated, “There is no accurate 
way to measure something that isn’t done often enough.” Respondent #65 takes a 
different approach and indicated in his response that his agency incorporates the 
performance of NIMS concepts into the evaluation process.  
Final comments about other NIMS-related issues that should be explored brought 
this straightforward statement from respondent #12:  
NIMS and ICS, both in practice and the training, have been grossly 
exaggerated. The training is bloated and mostly irrelevant. The concepts 
could be taught in half the time. The program has lost credibility because 
the training is repetitive and banal. It dwells on job titles with seemingly 
endless sub-divisions, a scenario that’s meaningful for a fraction of the 
nation’s agencies. It’s no wonder that I see people (professionals, not 
sloths) literally rolling their eyes when attending these sessions, while the 
instructors prattle on about the forms that need to be filled out. 
H. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 
The answers to the questions fell within two major types. The first and most 
recurring type related to issues internal to the respondent’s agency: lack of funding, the 
small workforce, lack of available training time, and lack of calls for service to reinforce 
the practice made the implementation and sustained use of NIMS impractical. The other 
theme was the complexity of the system, which scares off practitioners. The agencies that 
appear to be proficient have a significant number of supervisors struggling with ICS 
concepts within an expanding incident. Agencies have made strides with preplanning 
events and interaction with other agencies within the locality, but three years or less is not 
enough time for employees to become comfortable with NIMS. 
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III. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Every NIMS-compliant organization has experienced some level of difficulty in 
initial implementation, or in efficiently sustaining the principles, or has reported less-
than-satisfactory results during an application of the incident command component. Even 
though no two incidents are exactly the same, there are lessons to be learned and 
incorporated into practice to continually improve operations. Mastery of the system is 
fleeting and performance or proficiency will at times ebb and flow, stealing the 
confidence of the practitioner. At other times, practice will reward that same practitioner 
for his persistence and diligence. Most law enforcement officials that use or might utilize 
NIMS will never be experts in this field. The assertion is that NIMS is not getting 
thoroughly incorporated into the culture of law enforcement organizations. Looking at the 
data collected here from the perspective of line-level supervisors and administrators with 
limited budgets and staffing will provide the most useful interpretation. 
The research questions to be addressed are: What barriers are there for Wisconsin 
law enforcement in adopting and routinely using NIMS, and how can those barriers be 
reduced?  
Any discussion involving NIMS can be difficult because many practitioners, even 
subject matter experts, routinely interchange the terms “NIMS” and the “incident 
command component” within the same sentence. Common misunderstanding of these 
terms is itself one of the barriers to NIMS adoption and use. The preface and another two 
pages in the National Incident Management System document are required in an attempt 
to fully explain the concept of NIMS.  
A. National Incident Management System—The National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic, proactive approach to 
guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly 
to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the 
effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in 
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order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. 
NIMS works hand in hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). 
NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the 
NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for 
incident management (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National 
Incident Management System 2008, Preface). 
The definition of incident command is found in the glossary of terms.  
 
B. Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized on-scene 
emergency management construct specifically designed to provide an 
integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and 
demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by 
jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, 
personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common 
organizational structure designed to aid in the management of resources 
during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to 
small as well as large and complex incidents. ICS is used by various 
jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, to organize 
field-level incident management operations (NIMS, p. 140). 
The terms NIMS and incident command are frequently used interchangeably, but 
the implications for institutionalization and sustainment of each are not the same.  
A. Institutionalization of NIMS—The initial successful effort by a 
jurisdiction to incorporate all of the components of NIMS from planning 
to recovery and mitigation into the culture of all the departments or units 
within that jurisdiction. 
B. Institutionalization of ICS (Incident Command System)—A law 
enforcement agency’s efforts to apply the classroom instruction from the 
ICS classes 100 through 800 into their organization’s daily operational 
responses. This effort is demonstrated by a concerted effort to develop and 
improve its competency in the use of the ICS techniques, tools, practices 
and vocabulary of ICS. The agency has developed policies concerning 
training, implementation and evaluation of ICS. The agency has devoted 
staff time to training and the equipment necessary for on-scene critical 
incident management.  
C. Sustainment of NIMS—While NIMS may have been initially instituted 
within an organization, this term is specific to the effort to maintain NIMS 
within the culture of the organization since its original implementation. 
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The definition of NIMS is long and, for a significant segment of law enforcement, 
vague. The NIMS concept can be so overwhelming that many just opt out, hoping that 
the big one won’t occur to their organization—at least not during their career. Evan 
Thomas describes slow organizational response, perhaps accurately, as “bureaucratic 
timidity” (Thomas, 2005). 
Recognizing timidity and accepting it are two different things. A law enforcement 
leader may be haunted in their next position or upon retirement if their present 
organization fails to perform adequately during a future critical incident. In essence, the 
leader has escaped after her watch but failed in the duty and responsibility to prepare 
others to respond. There is not a retirement community shielded enough to rest at if one 
of their past employees should be impacted by inadequately prepared supervisors or 
insufficient training. Those agencies where thorough analysis has clearly identified the 
risks have an even greater responsibility for addressing preparation and response.  
Because NIMS and the incident command system component can at times be 
confusing, and because the two can unconsciously be interchanged with each other, the 
following discussion will attempt to clearly differentiate whether the subject of analysis is 
the entire NIMS or the ICS component.  
The majority of Wisconsin law enforcement personnel will be able to recognize at 
least one if not several of the barriers identified below as issues that pertain to their 
agency. Many will also recognize barriers that confront the overall state of their local 
emergency operations.  
B. BARRIERS TO BE STUDIED 
Sufficient data has been developed through the survey and through the literature 
review to clearly identify barriers that have been known for some time and informally 
discussed as well as some that are newly identified. Lack of an organizational 
commitment to adopt NIMS constitutes one of the principal categories of barriers. The 




other significant claims. The difficulty in studying these barriers is that they may not be 
impediments at all but actually could be easily overcome, depending upon the resources 
within that community.  
1. Organizational Commitment 
Varying levels of organizational commitment can severely impact full or partial 
success in the implementation and sustainment of NIMS. This category evoked many 
responses explaining why some agencies have opted out or are not proficient in NIMS. 
a. Complexity of the Incident Command System 
Some respondents stated that the complexity of the ICS is evident early 
and often within the initial training. The concepts and organization of this expandable 
system can be overwhelming and can scare off some. A feeling of helplessness can 
emerge when those responsible for implementation think about not only handling an 
incident of large scale but simultaneously trying to manage the command and control and 
incoming resources that can come with NIMS. State emergency managers raised the 
subject of complexity as a concern when asked by FEMA to identify barriers to NIMS 
compliance. NEMA respondents report that “even after training, there is still confusion 
over one’s role in an event” (National Emergency Management Association, 2008, p. 1). 
Donahue and Tuohy interviewed first response practitioners and learned that: “ICS is in 
common use, but it is not understood and implemented in a consistent manner. Often, 
training is too simplistic to delve into the subtle skills of disciplined team-based decision 
making” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 7).  
Those agencies that have successfully implemented and sustained NIMS 
report that the system is very difficult, but like anything worthwhile, it is worth the effort 
once a certain level of organizational expertise has been reached. The increased 
camaraderie that comes with a positive critical incident outcome and after-action report 
can support an organization for months.  
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b.  Inability to Adequately Institute Lessons Learned 
Law enforcement, like most other organizations involved with emergency 
management, has trouble committing to complicated or significant change even if that 
change has been shown to improve operations. Substantial data demonstrate that lessons 
learned are difficult to incorporate. “Reports and lessons are often ignored, and even 
when they are not, lessons are too often isolated and perishable, rather than generalized 
and institutionalized” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 10). Donahue and Tuohy concluded 
their report with recommendations for improving methods of training and exercise; 
establishing a comprehensive site to develop and debate ideas; and introducing incentives 
to institutionalize the lessons-learning process. Their findings indicate that there must be 
motivation and a rigorous formal change process instituted within the organization.  
There is little doubt that fairly easy-to-handle learned lessons that involve 
a simple procedure or an equipment change are made in organizations almost on a daily 
basis. Complicated issues are another matter. Perhaps such problems cannot be totally 
solved by new systems or strategies, but continuing attempts must be made by subject 
matter experts at least to partially address them.  
c. Incident Command is Built for the Fire Service  
Some survey respondents felt that ICS was designed for fire departments 
and that law enforcement needs were not taken into account. It is a fact that originally 
ICS was developed for wildfire incidents. The National Emergency Management 
Association’s survey of its state emergency-management coordinators also reports, “Not 
all entities believe it is the best-designed system” (National Emergency Management 
Association, 2008, p. 1). Baltic reports that “among practitioners, it is recognized that 
ICS has been most successful among firefighting organizations and less successful with 
law enforcement, public health, and public work organizations” (Buck, Trainor, & 
Aguirre, 2006, p. 4). 
Howitt and Leonard point out that ICS does a lot for the fire service 
(Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006, p. 41). It clarifies command, assigns responsibility, 
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provides for collaboration among responders, and is scalable, ICS can accomplish these 
tasks because of the presence of roughly comparable or standardized components of fire 
departments and the comparably more stable and scientifically understood nature of fire 
as a hazard. They point out, however, that these dimensions are not as pronounced in law 
enforcement response. When the time comes to participate in a complex disaster 
involving multiple agencies where ICS could be helpful, law enforcement personnel are 
not familiar enough with it to implement it successfully.  
While it is true that ICS may have originally been developed for the fire 
service, the United States Coast Guard also utilizes the Incident Command System. 
Actually, incident command and NIMS are at least as fitting for law enforcement as they 
are for fire. “NIMS extends to civilian life the logic of military organizations” (Buck, 
Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006, p. 16). Thus, in one regard it is an excellent tool for law 
enforcement. Incident command might be slanted towards the fire service, but it certainly 
can be made to work for law enforcement. Many law enforcement organizations 
successful in NIMS have worked with the challenges of ICS with their fire service 
counterparts to reach a mutual understanding of each other’s role in critical-incident 
response, and they have found that the incident command system, while not perfect, is 
adaptable enough and forms a common structure from within so that both can attain their 
operational goals. 
d. Incident Command is a Perishable Skill  
Some respondents suggested that agencies just have to take the leap—
adopt NIMS and be committed to it. Because of the complexity of the ICS concepts, 
however, that program must be practiced on a regular basis. If at all possible, ICS should 
be incorporated within daily operations. Practice will lead to more confidence and 
familiarity with the terms and protocols.  
Some agencies require the use of ICS terms with every call for service 
where three or more officers have been dispatched. Chief Susan Riseling of the 
University of Wisconsin–Madison Police Department reports that in her agency an 
incident commander is announced, and priorities are established and carried out by that 
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commander (Riseling, personal communication, August 8, 2008). There is an expectation 
that the associated incident reports from a UW-Madison response will articulate the 
incident priorities and provide documentation that they have, in fact, been carried out.  
Smaller law enforcement agencies of 25 employees or fewer stressed in 
their survey responses that there are not enough actual incidents to institute the routine 
use of the IC system. They point out that use brings the best reinforcement of lessons, and 
without the actual incidents, skills cannot realistically be kept sharp. These agencies are 
realistic enough to recognize that even with a program of practice, little can be done to 
ensure well-run command and control without at least some prior actual experience in the 
field.   
e. Lack of Buy-In by Employees 
It was commented in the survey responses that it is difficult to obtain buy-
in from employees. Buy-in is a concern for managers with any significant organizational 
change. If management shows a lack of commitment, the rank and file will sense that 
timidity, and implementation will be that much more difficult. Management, through 
goals and objectives, can assist in establishing clear guidance regarding its expectations 
for the individuals and groups within the organization. The New Jersey State Police has 
initiated such a system, which has a component for ensuring buy-in with their employees. 
A considerable philosophical change was recently made in their overall approach to 
policing with the adoption of Intelligence Led Policing. The agency went about the 
change in its organization with rigor. NJSP began by “aggressively changing its 
operational processes to bring improved structure to its near, mid, and long-term 
planning” (Fuentes, 2006, p. 5). New Jersey also has adopted the concept of an 
intelligence cycle which promotes the continual reevaluation of its goals and objectives. 
Developing differing levels of goals and objectives specific to the group from command 
through bureaus, units and groups ensure accountability and associated buy-in. Goals can 
then easily be developed to implement NIMS and ICS. Regular review of those goals can 
identify a lack of buy-in, and strategies can be developed to address timidity by 
supervisors or employees.  
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Paul France, the southeast regional director for Emergency Management 
in Wisconsin, states that chief officers need to walk the walk. They need to work hard 
and develop their own ICS competence. France points out that one will not be able to 
motivate the line staff to utilize good ICS at street level if the command officers are not 
observed to be ICS competent.  
However, lack of buy-in may not occur simply because of lack of 
commitment or interest by the employees. One respondent in the survey commented that 
it is incumbent on management to reinforce the positive benefits of NIMS to the 
employees and to point out that the system could enhance their safety and professional 
response, both as an organization and individually.  
f. Lack of Agency Prioritization  
A few survey respondents stated that incident command was not be used 
on a daily basis but only for large-scale incidents. This logic is explained as follows: 
“Developing a sustainable sense of commitment to a new process requires a persistent 
sense of urgency about change and improvement. In effect, organizations will stick with 
their accepted routines, absent persistent challenges to their assumptions” (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006, p. 27). Gaining departments’ long-term commitment to NIMS will be 
difficult if those departments feel that their present system is adequate.  
There are many veteran and respected law enforcement leaders who say 
the same thing regarding NIMS that respected academics within the Center of Homeland 
Defense and Security program repeat time and again: Why should I believe you? This is a 
legitimate challenge to those who suggest that compliance with NIMS is essential. Many 
law enforcement leaders report that they have suffered no catastrophe, or that they have 
been involved in significant critical incidents that were not mishandled; to spend the time 
and effort to train up to NIMS compliance is a fool’s approach in their view. To dedicate 
the necessary time and effort for real proficiency in NIMS—that would be the real 
mismanagement of precious resources, they feel.  
The nationally known and respected law enforcement consultant Gordon 
Graham preaches about the importance of reducing civil liability through increased 
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training. He states that it is much more important to train for the high-risk, low-frequency 
events than for the everyday occurrences (Graham Research Consultants). Logically, law 
enforcement is, through our continual response to those everyday incidents, well trained 
and practiced to handle those events. It is the low-frequency events that have the potential 
for the highest personal and professional cost to both the administrator and the officer 
directly involved.  
An example of such a high-risk, low-frequency incident occurred on July 
31, 2008. A gunman killed three, and two were wounded in Marinette County in upper 
Wisconsin. The ensuing manhunt involved over 100 officers and the event eventually 
came to a safe conclusion, with the gunman turning himself in 18 hours later. The after-
action report indicated that there were concerns with the way incident command had been 
conducted, and the following are some of the significant corrective actions that were 
identified: “(Training, policy/procedure) in Incident Management/Unified Command 
Training for all department supervisors and managers. Get comfortable using the ICS 
functions and create an incident action plan for events. The incident command posts need 
to be located outside the hot-zone” (Marinette County Emergency Management, 2008, p. 
5). 
Unfortunately, this incident was at least the third recent incident involving 
a homicidal gunman at large who was inflicting multiple killings in the communities of 
northern Wisconsin. These were dangerously fluid and unstable incidents that involved 
either military or law enforcement trained offenders. Incidents of this type require well-
coordinated incident command structure, with the establishment of safety officers and 
safety plans. The potential for additional homicides involving innocent citizens or law 
enforcement personnel is very possible. The trend for more high-risk, low-frequency 
events seems to have increased with no signs of slowing.  
Random shooters have little consideration for committing their act in 
locations where the police have enough personnel to adequately respond. They are 





possibility of an adequately staffed and rapid law enforcement response. Unfortunately 
the formerly high-risk, low-frequency active shooter is occurring at a much more 
frequent rate.  
g.  Competing Local Priorities 
These are difficult times in Wisconsin history with budgetary issues on 
state, county, and local levels. More so now than before, managers are facing reductions 
in budgets and staffing. Fat from programs within law enforcement has been the focus for 
some years already, and there is little, if any, left. Now, much like the private sector, even 
well-run essential programs and associated staffing are on the block. Chiefs among the 
survey respondents mentioned the difficulty just to maintain present levels of service, 
much less to address the growth in preparation, prevention, response, and recovery that is 
the heart of NIMS. Further development within the profession is not the main priority for 
many; rather it is survival of their organization. Donahue and Tuohy used a methodology 
of interviews, a review of documents, and a focus group retreat to probe difficulties in 
learning. Their research also touched on competing priorities and how those priorities 
influence learning: 
Institutionalizing a new process requires long-term commitment. What 
makes learning processes especially vulnerable are that there are too many 
short-term distracters. Other political priorities, sensational concerns like 
terrorism, workforce turnover, other concurrent organizational change 
efforts, and daily missions all conspire to derail organizational transition. 
As a practical matter, then the main problem with lesson learning can be 
seen as a lack of will and commitment rather than a lack of ability. 
(Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 21) 
Donahue and Touhy also point out that “politicians tend to respond to 
more immediately pressing demands, deferring investments in emergency preparedness 
until a major event re-awakens public concern” (p. 10). Even if chiefs understand the 
importance of commitment to NIMS, it is often difficult to compete with more pressing 
local budget needs as seen by their bosses. 
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The Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau survey of emergency managers 
is a revealing study regarding competing priorities. That survey found that “21 of 36 
respondents indicated that their largest unmet financial need was for more personnel” 
(Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2006, p. 3). The central department within county 
government most able to provide the support that smaller agencies need for training and 
emergency management expertise are themselves understaffed. That same 2006 survey 
revealed that only 27 of the 40 emergency management directors spend one hundred 
percent of their time on emergency management duties. In most cases there is no cavalry 
coming to assist the outnumbered law enforcement administrators.  
There are also competing priorities at the county and state level. Jerry 
Haberl of Wisconsin Emergency Management reports that out of 72 counties and 10 
tribes, 63 have one principal emergency management employee. Only 11 programs have 
more than one person assigned. Many of the 63 full-time directors also have other duties 
and responsibilities, such as 911 communications, assigned to them. In many counties 
less than 40 hours a week is available to be dedicated to NIMS (personal communication, 
August 5, 2008). The state has the same dilemma as a statewide NIMS coordinator, and 
support staff requests have been in place and unfulfilled for the last few years.  
h. Reliance on State or Federal Response 
There is an element of law enforcement that is relying on the county or 
state to respond to a critical incident beyond their capabilities. There are supporting 
response plans in place to assist overwhelmed local officials, but much as Louisiana 
officials learned from the Katrina response, reaction and actual response time can be a 
long time in coming. County and state officials can be overwhelmed by requests as well, 
and locals need to preplan a response with the anticipation that it could be several hours 
before assistance can arrive. A perfect example is the 2008 floods that impacted 36 
counties in Wisconsin. In Milwaukee County every municipality, including the city of 
Milwaukee, was severely impacted during the first 24 hours of rainstorms. There was no 
assistance available through Milwaukee County Emergency Management or the sheriff’s 
office. It took the small EM staff 24 hours just to overcome the influx of phone calls and 
 32
to set up a functional emergency operation center. In that first 24 hours gaining 
situational awareness was all that could be effectively accomplished.  
An associated concern is that some believe, based on their successful 
previous law enforcement experiences, that they will be able to step up and improvise as 
fluid situations present themselves. This confidence and prior training has served them 
well, but unfortunately there are just as many horror stories reflected in after-action 
reports and lessons to be learned from this belief. 
The recent effort to develop incident management teams within the state 
of Wisconsin partially addresses this barrier. If and when these teams become 
operational, there will be a coordinated effort to bring subject-matter experts and trained 
incident-management section chiefs in to assist local authorities. There is still an 
expectation that the local response will be consistent with NIMS principles, that the 
incoming IMTs will be able to communicate effectively with the local responders, and 
that the local first responders will understand the terms and the philosophy of NIMS. 
i. Analytical Thinking Needed by Administrators  
It is difficult for law enforcement administrators to step away from 
approaching situations outside their normal operational level and to look from the forty-
thousand-foot view. Looking operationally has served them well in most critical-incident 
management situations. An incident commander cannot help but become subject to tunnel 
vision while involved in managing a stressful complicated scene. By requiring the 
commander to focus on following a preplan, NIMS concentrates on the tendency toward 
tunnel vision. An administrator is greatly helping his operations by gathering together all 
potential stakeholders in order to develop a response to a few of those incidents that are 
most apt to occur within that communityjurisdiction. It is easier to think from the forty-
thousand-foot view at a tabletop than from a command post. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007, p. 34) points out that 
“an effective, coordinated response begins with sound planning well before an incident 
occurs. The planning process will translate policy, strategy, doctrine, and capabilities into 
specific task and course of action to be undertaken during a response.”  
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While it has been recognized that competing priorities and inadequate 
staffing can steal an administrator’s planning time, it is essential that administrators do 
not totally abandon their requirement to plan.  
2. Home Rule 
It has been mentioned to the Wisconsin NIMS Advisory Committee that one of 
the potential hindrances to the uniform adoption of NIMS is the freedom to govern as a 
local entity sees fit as guaranteed in the home rule doctrine. This doctrine has also been 
cited just as vigorously as an important protection from federal or state imposition of 
unwarranted mandates. The home rule doctrine has been enacted in Wisconsin and at 
least 38 other states. In 1924 the Wisconsin Constitution was amended to add wording 
granting authority to cities regarding their governance: “Cities and Villages organized 
pursuant to state law may determine their local affairs and government, subject only to 
this constitution and to such enactments for the legislature of statewide concern as with 
the uniformity shall affect every city or every village” (Milsap, 2008, p. 4). This 
amendment limits state authority in local affairs unless the state enacts legislation that 
uniformly applies to every city and village. Adopting additional statewide language is 
something that has been strenuously avoided in the past.  
The county too has little power over local authority. A county sheriff provides law 
enforcement services to unincorporated areas or to a particular municipality where a joint 
agreement has been struck. The chief elected official of a particular municipality, 
however, has the final authority; the state functions in a supporting role. Wisconsin 
Statute 166.03(5)(a) “provides the role of any state agency is to assist local units of 
government and law enforcement agencies in responding to an emergency.” Authority 
has not legally been established for primary rule by the state or by the county. 
Governance is granted by law at the municipal level or, as the saying goes in Wisconsin, 
government is controlled at the grassroots level.  
Wisconsin and its police chiefs cherish the long-standing tradition of home rule 
and the flexibility that this independence provides in both governance and management. 
This autonomy cannot and will not be overcome. Home rule protects local government 
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from many state requests that otherwise would mandate reporting. Any concept that calls 
for locals to self-report their performance will have to incorporate the understanding that 
reporting will be accomplished by voluntary compliance. Chiefs will have to be 
persuaded that self-reporting is for the general good of the overall Wisconsin law 
enforcement response and its standards, their individual agency, and the safety of their 
citizens and employees. 
3. Interjurisdictional Collaboration 
In the state of Wisconsin there is no data on the effective working relationship or 
level of cooperation between local police agencies and their direct counterparts, the 
county sheriffs. It is no secret, though, that some relationships are strongly 
interdependent, and others function only when there is an absolute requirement. Randi 
Milsap, General Counsel and Chief Advisor to Emergency Management of the Wisconsin 
Department of Military Affairs is one observer who has witnessed this sometimes self-
imposed barrier. Some of her primary assignments include working with legislators on a 
joint committee to update Chapter 166 of the Wisconsin statutes related to emergency 
management. She reports that there is often uneasiness in the law enforcement 
relationship, and police and sheriff’s officials frequently do not align themselves on 
important issues (Milsap, 2008). Ms. Milsap has advised that until we can sit down and 
establish a meaningful dialogue with each other and nurture working relationships, 
significant change will continue to be slow and difficult.  
There are specific and high-profile examples of missed opportunities in 
collaboration. From February 5–7, 2008, major blizzard conditions created a situation on 
I-90 in Dane County requiring significant emergency assistance. Because the need for 
coordinated command and control came too slowly, hundreds of persons were left 
stranded for hours, some overnight, in an impassible stretch of the highway. As an 
organization, there is perhaps no better ICS proponent than the Wisconsin State Patrol, 
but in its review of this incident, substantial issues were identified with the use of ICS. 
Collaboration between first responders was also a concern. This event gained 
Governor Doyle’s attention and that of the national media shortly thereafter. The 
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governor called for “1) a review of the emergency response, coordination and 
communication among multiple agencies and jurisdictions in responding to the situation; 
2) accurate and timely assessment of the severity of the situation; and 3) effective and 
timely communication to the public” (Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs, 2008, 
p. 5). The subsequent investigation was led by the Adjutant General who found that, 
“Although the State Patrol was the lead agency for response, several other state agencies 
were in a position to have helped the Patrol when it became clear that incident command 
leadership was lacking” (p. 6).  
This is a situation where closing a highway or other forms of prevention could 
have saved hundreds from being stranded in icy, snowy road conditions for a 12-hour 
period. The Adjutant General learned during his investigation that there is an assumption 
on the part of law enforcement that “Wisconsin does not close highways. Proper planning 
would have perhaps allowed an incident action plan that did allow for this contingency” 
(p.  5). 
Relationships between law enforcement and those in other departments within 
local government and the private sector are also underdeveloped. Anyone who might 
potentially be a stakeholder at an incident needs to be part of the essential process of 
preparedness. Captain Bonnie Regan of the Arlington County Virginia Police, assigned 
as the deputy director of emergency management and a responder to the Pentagon attack, 
has remarked that “you don’t want to be exchanging business cards on the day of the 
incident” (personal communication with author, 2009). Excellent examples of strong 
working relationships exist, but the literature shows that successes have come because of 
the effort put in on the front side before collaboration is needed at an event. Buck, 
Trainor, and Aguirre point out several incidents—the Northridge earthquake, the 
Oklahoma City bombing, the Pentagon incident—that are all examples where previous 
interaction and preplanning assisted in the successful implementation of the ICS (2006, 
p. 7). In the case of Northridge, the IC knew and respected the leadership of the taskforce 
and their capabilities. The Pentagon incident occurred in a region that had experienced an 
important transformation in its readiness posture in the aftermath of the Air Florida crash 
of 1982.  
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Lack of collaboration in incident management is not the only barrier to effective 
emergency management. The need for collaborative efforts in the preparedness 
component of NIMS is just as important. Waukesha County took a proactive approach to 
NIMS compliance. There, in 2005, they developed the Waukesha County NIMS Working 
Group. Captain Mark Stigler of the Waukesha Police Department reports that tasks were 
divided among 58 agency leaders in the county. Goals and objectives were developed, 
and subcommittees established in 1) interoperable communications; 2) homeland security 
exercise and evaluation program; 3) incident action planning; 4) resource typing; and 5) 
command and control across the county. The tasks of NIMS compliance are not as 
daunting when the issues are distributed among groups.  
4. One Size does Not Fit All 
Wisconsin Emergency Management and the NIMS Advisory Group submitted a 
joint response to the National Emergency Managers Association survey regarding those 
challenges they have identified to NIMS compliance. They called attention to what they 
believe are false assumptions by the federal government:  
One is the assumption that “one size fits all” which assumes that all 
jurisdictions have the same level of resources, risks, hazards and 
vulnerability … like all states [they] range from large metropolitan areas 
to rural low density jurisdictions and attempting to apply the same rules 
for implementation or even the same set of logical reasons for complying 
is not possible. (National Emergency Management Association, 2008, 
p. 1).  
One of the most frequently reported concerns is that NIMS does not address a 
solution for all the different sized law enforcement organizations within a state. Small 
agencies simply do not have the personnel to utilize the advantages of an expandable ICS 
system.  
In 1993, Milwaukee County developed the Suburban Mutual Assistance Response 
Teams, or SMART. SMART modeled its program on the Northern Illinois Police Alarm 
System of a tiered mutual aid response of additional law enforcement personnel and 
equipment. Waukesha County eventually was added, creating a force of up to 40 
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additional officers, one from each agency, which could be deployed through an 
incremental request. Five squads would be sent within each level up to a Level 8 
response. These agencies agreed in principal not to charge for mutual aid service. While 
agreements cannot supersede state law, the 40 SMART members received unanimous 
support from their governing bodies; these groups recognized that sending support to a 
stricken community provides that same opportunity for support to every community in 
case it falls victim to an overwhelming incident. To this date, no member community has 
invoked state law and requested reimbursement. While addressing the need for immediate 
personnel, there is a gap that SMART does not address, the need for additional command 
structure to assist once personnel starts arriving.  
5. Training 
Concerns with initial and ongoing training are probably the barriers to NIMS 
compliance that are communicated most frequently. The complaints run the gamut: that 
there is too much training, too little training, too much theory, not enough practical 
exercise; the training is not interactive enough; there is not enough funding for training; it 
is impossible to schedule staff away from primary duties to obtain all the training needed; 
there is a need for more classrooms, fewer classrooms. Respondents also report that the 
complexity of the system makes learning and retention of learning difficult; that there is 
too much or not enough concentration on large-scale incidents; and that training needs to 
be customized for the size of agency.  
Annual training alone will not provide the expertise needed to be proficient in ICS 
or to fulfill NIMS preparedness needs. Somewhat surprisingly, a large majority of 
respondents indicated the standard training they provide is yearly or as required. There 
are many legitimate reasons for the infrequency of training—funding, competing 
priorities, shortage of personnel, and lack of adequate trainers. Another key to explaining 
the lack of confidence or proficiency with the system is the fact that a large majority of 
respondents have only been involved with NIMs for three years or less. Three years is 
still a fledgling stage in a complex organizational change. There is little hope for 
successful implementation of a program with only sporadic training and no indoctrination 
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of the program into daily use. The only way to become better at defense and arrest tactics 
is through repetition. The only way to become more proficient in the ICS portion of 
NIMS is through the day-to-day repetition of the concepts. When the survey asked what 
those successful in NIMS implementation would recommend to those struggling now, 
several mentioned incorporating ICS into daily operations.  
As stated at the outset, Wisconsin proudly reports having trained at least 4,000 
responders. NIMS compliance classes of ICS 100 through 800 are a series of essential 
steps for senior staff members. The state and the local agencies have spent thousands of 
hours and dollars in the initial training. The survey confirms that, in many cases, that 
money may have been wasted since little, if any, connection has been made after training. 
Many have attended the training simply to fulfill the requirements and nothing more.  
As an associated problem, once some return to their departments, they find that 
there is no overall plan in place to utilize what has just been taught. The skills needed to 
employ a complex system such as ICS are quickly perishable.  
6. Central Oversight and Accountability 
There is no central branch within Wisconsin that has been granted the authority to 
compel compliance, and some see this as an obstacle to the adoption of NIMS. The 
Governor’s Homeland Security Council has only advisory power. WEM Director Johnnie 
Smith has voiced concern about the lack of a true oversight branch at the state level. 
“Another disadvantage is that the status quo supports a homeland security advisor who 
does not possess authority commensurate with the designation of being in charge of 
coordinating homeland security activities on a statewide basis” (Smith, 2007, p. 60). 
The 2008 State of Wisconsin Preparedness Report contains some measurable 
indicators, such as how many first responders have been trained, a review of what 
programs have been implemented, and the exercises actually conducted statewide. There 
is no data indicating success in achieving goals and objectives that have been instituted 
on a local level. There is no indication that local government actually has goals. Instead, 
the preparedness report functions more to ensure that we have fulfilled the National 
Incident Management grant requirements—and nothing more. 
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The members within the NIMS Advisory Group of Wisconsin come from a wide 
range of disciplines and have been vocal about the lack of accountability: “NIMS has no 
accountability system in place for ensuring NIMS compliance.… Without an 
accountability system in place, NIMS will continue to fail.… Local agencies were told 
originally that they must be NIMS compliant/that was a hollow threat. I have not heard of 
one case nationally where a department or agency was denied anything.… Local NIMS 
compliance is falling off to nothing because no one is holding any agency accountable” 
(Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 2006, p. 3). This is a clear warning that, without 
the proper compliance tools, there is little hope of sustaining NIMS.  
a. The Kettl Commission Effort to Create Government 
Accountability  
In 2001, Governor Tommy Thompson commissioned a high-profile 
alliance of individuals to study new ways to collaborate and cut waste involving state and 
local government. This group became known as the Kettl Commission. The commission 
results were eagerly awaited by state and local leaders in the hopes of providing the 
impetus for meaningful change and perhaps justification for the consolidation of many 
services at all levels of government. The release of the recommendations created intense 
debate at the local level. Local governments studied the recommendations, and there was 
a call for partial or full organizational consolidations and the reduction of personnel.  
The Kettl Commission recommended that Wisconsin immediately launch 
a statewide performance review of all state agencies and local governments. This review 
would christen a new program. “Renew Wisconsin ought to be a top-to-bottom 
performance scrub of Wisconsin’s state and local governments. It ought to identify 
opportunities for improving the government’s responsiveness and reducing their cost” 
(State of Wisconsin, 2001, p. 6).  
A primary concept of the commission was that government needed to be 
tied to results. “Almost two-thirds of the state budget goes to aids for local governments, 
too much of this money flows without a clear connection to results” (p. 1). The hope for 
improved accountability in this report died a fairly quick death with little, if any, of the 
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recommendations being implemented. That was the last effort in collaboration, and it 
provides a lesson of the obstacles that exist for those in Wisconsin who would try again 
in the future.  
One way to address oversight was recommended by Johnnie Smith in his 
thesis. There he pointed out that the legislature should consider the creation of a 
Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety (Smith, 2007, p. 65). The 
rationale for this recommendation was the creation of other important agencies, including 
Department of Health and Family Services and the Department of Transportation, which 
were created to address critical needs in planning and coordinating activities essential to 
the citizens of the state. The state thus has a history of addressing administrative 
oversight.  
As another example, the Wisconsin legislature addressed oversight when it 
enacted a law to mandate law enforcement compliance to institute specific policy 
development and reporting requirements regarding high-speed pursuits. That action has 
brought about a reduction in fatal crashes and has reduced civil liability cases. There has 
been no history of great bodily harm or death caused by the mismanagement of critical 
incident scenes to bring NIMS to the attention of the Wisconsin legislature.  
7. Program Evaluation 
Oversight and accountability concerns arise not only from the lack of a full 
program evaluation at the federal level of NIMS, but also at the state and local level as 
well. The most frequent form of evaluation is process evaluation, as that “focuses on 
what the program actually does” (Powell, 2006, p. 103). Documenting the effectiveness 
of the programs would make valuable information available for all levels of government. 
City, county, and state administrators could formulate meaningful future goals and 
objectives based on this evaluation.  
Powell provides reasons for initiating evaluation that all levels of government 
should consider. Local law enforcement might consider instituting program evaluation 
because it could actually enhance both local public and government support in the 
following ways: 
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1. Account for how they use their limited resources; 
2. Explain what they do; 
3. Enhance their visibility; 
4. Describe their impact; 
5. Increase efficiency; 
6. Avoid errors; 
7. Support planning activities; 
8. Express concern for their public; 
9. Support decision making; 
10. Strengthen their political position (p. 103).  
a. Employee Evaluation 
It is not only at the department level that evaluation may be lacking 
proficiency measurement. Individual officers are not held to a state standard in ICS. The 
Department of Justice administers the Division of Law Enforcement Service and the 
Bureau of Training and Standards. Training and Standards is responsible for setting 
standards for recruit training within the state. However, there is little authority to monitor 
officers once they have completed their initial recruit certification other than through the 
established annual training of 24 hours. Ken Hammond, Law Enforcement Training 
Director for the State of Wisconsin (personal communication, September 2, 2008), states 
that these 24 hours of annual training can be satisfied by a wide variety of subject matter, 
and there is no control over what individual agencies decide to focus upon. The result is a 
multitude of law enforcement agencies of varying operational efficiency and abilities. 
Many agencies, because of a lack of funding, cannot provide much more training than 
this mandatory minimum amount for their officers.  
One insightful Wisconsin sheriff in the survey tied employee buy-in to 
establishing a commitment to NIMS and ICS through a rating on the employee annual 
evaluation. It is not evident that this is a widespread practice, but annual employee goals 




Surprising to some perhaps, but not to those involved, is that funding is a concern 
for the very largest to the very smallest law enforcement agencies. The National 
Emergency Management Association listed funding as perhaps the major barrier in its 
survey. As respondents reported, there is no dedicated NIMS funding to support 
compliance and no dedicated funding for ongoing compliance. Thus, NIMS is just 
another example of an unfunded mandate shifted to states and local government that will 
be impossible to sustain without continued funding.  
Establishing funding for some local emergency management agencies has been 
difficult, and the problem exists at the state and federal level as well. The State of 
Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (draft) for 2009–2011 stated, “Funding is and 
will remain a challenge. Since peaking in 2003, federal grant programs have continued to 
recede and, although many advocate a substantive increase in federal funding using fiscal 
year 2005 as a baseline, the future funding level is uncertain” (Governor’s Office–
Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009, p. 4).  
Other than withholding grants, there are no real penalties for NIMS non-
compliance. Instead of withholding grants that matter to some but not to others, some say 
that real financial incentives or substantial penalties need to be established. Some 
respondents report that, based on the actual use and projected return for their investment, 
adequate funding to sustain NIMS is not a priority, much less a high priority, within their 
budget.  
9. Civil Liability 
A new and emerging barrier to NIMS compliance and proficiency has been the 
exposure of organizations and administrators to civil liability for management of critical 
incident scenes. Brad Pinsky, an attorney and captain in the Manlius Fire Department, 
wrote an article entitled “NIMS Directives and Liability” for the Fire Engineering 
Web site (Pinsky, 2009). This article examined a newly identified form of civil liability 
for failure to provide an identified standard of care, as recognized in Prince v. Waters, 
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850 N.Y.S. 2d 803 (2008), a decision from the appellate division of the Supreme Court of 
New York. This case is relevant because there a “high level court in New York State held 
that the failure to follow a mandatory, nondiscretionary NIMS directive served as a basis 
for liability against a fire department.” Mr. Pinsky states, “that the failure to follow NIMS 
may serve as a basis for liability, as it ‘mandates a reasonably defined and precedentially 
developed standard of care, and does not require the fact’s trier to second guess a 
firefighter’s split-second weighing of choices’ ” (p. 2). The NIMS manual has many 
directives that impact first responders. The NIMS drafters used the word “must” in many 
of the directions (FEMA-Web site), and it is “unknown if they intended the word ‘must’ 
to carry liability for noncompliance, but the New York court viewed the word’s use 
seriously” (p. 2).  
This case should be a concern for law enforcement administrators because it could 
place them at risk when implementing NIMS policy and procedures. While 
administrators should be careful what wording is used in the policy, as long as that policy 
is used as guidance and allows commanders the discretion to deviate within it, there is 
protection.  
What this case also shows is that command and control errors of omission and 
commission can be costly to personal reputation and can incur civil liability. This case is 
one example of new litigation opportunities since the enactment of NIMS. Being 
compliant in NIMS could now bring a new area of exposure for administrators. Liability 
has always existed for any mismanaged law enforcement critical-incident response, but 
attempts to increase professional law enforcement response in a more structured way are 
providing an equal and opposite consequence for that good faith effort.  
10. Difficult to Implement and Sustain 
In summary, there are two primary reasons that NIMS is difficult to master. The 
first is that the overall NIMS system requires an enormous commitment of time and 




prevention, protection, response and recovery” (Governor’ Office–Wisconsin Homeland 
Security Council, 2009, p. 7). Each area of focus requires long-term redefining of an 
agency’s mission and commitment.  
The system can be so overwhelming to an administrator or command staff 
member assigned to emergency management–related duties that a feeling of paralysis can 
quickly overtake any initial enthusiasm, becoming fatal before one can even begin 
compliance efforts. Much like tutors assist those weighed down by complex concepts in 
the academic environment, a tutor or mentor might be needed to walk the student 
(administrator) step by step through the minefield. As previously identified, county 
emergency management agencies may or may not have the staffing or the expertise to act 
as that tutor. Where does an administrator go for summer school? One answer might be 
the place where others go who are searching for smart practices: the Department of 
Homeland Security has launched a lessons-learned site located at 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/index. Based on the listed membership of Wisconsin law 
enforcement agencies, it is not a very well-known or frequently accessed resource.  
One area of hope for struggling agencies is the wealth of information now being 
developed by many agencies in their preplanning efforts. Guidance can be accessed from 
other cooperative organizations that may have already brainstormed through the tedious 
development of incident action plans. Those plans already developed can act as a kind of 
shortcut and sample smart practice for those agencies that lack the time and resources to 
work through a substantial preplanning process. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, 
and what are good tactical and operational goals and objectives for one agency are 
probably very similar to the needs within a neighboring jurisdiction as well. It is at least a 
good starting point with which to begin discussion with other first responders within a 
community.  
The second major issue to the implementation barrier is the intricacy of the 
Incident Command System component. An escalating incident that requires an incident 
commander to expand the ICS organizational chart and, perhaps even worse, activate an 
emergency operation center, can create as much anxiety as the incident itself.  
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One ICS definition fittingly describes the breadth of ICS theory as “a disaster 
management tool based on a series of rational bureaucratic principles similar to those 
often discussed in organizational studies as classical management theory” (Morgan, 1986, 
p. 26). Once the decision has been made to conduct command and control using the 
incident command system, the organization and its leadership cannot waiver. The 
leadership must use all of its authority and, perhaps more importantly, its influence to 
gain success. Swanson and Territo (1982) assert:  
Leadership is defined as the process of influencing organizational 
members to use their energy willingly and appropriately to facilitate the 
achievement of a police department’s goals. This process of influencing is 
accomplished by communication, a significant portion of which occurs in 
face-to-face verbal transactions, often on a one-to-one or a leader-to-
small-group basis (p. 123).  
Mastering ICS is a continual process—and just plain hard work. Immediate 
positive results may not be readily evident. There will be naysayers in the short term who 
will attempt to make the case that the effort is not returning enough for the investment. 
However, many Wisconsin agencies proudly report that there is a long-term positive 
impact. Tangible confidence and positive after-action reports reflect excellent 
performance by staff through ongoing training and use of the program. Line officers often 
feel a newfound trust or confidence in their supervisors and their organization.  
It does not take long for word to spread among others within the first-responder 
community that an organization has embraced NIMS and that its responses are well 
planned, organized, and reflect officer safety as a priority. Feedback to line officers from 
their neighboring and sometimes distant peers eventually does make its way back. There 
can be a rejuvenation of organizational pride when someone from the outside 
environment relates to an officer that things are being done right in his department. 
Outside positive feedback is worth perhaps ten times that which comes from an officer’s 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis is titled “Is NIMS going to get us where we need to be-A Law 
Enforcement Perspective.” At this point the question is, well, is it? The conclusion is that 
for some law enforcement agencies within the state of Wisconsin, NIMS has been 
everything it was thought to be. NIMS has changed forever the organizational capabilities 
of some agencies in preparedness, response, and recovery. For many other agencies the 
answer is resounding: We’re compliant but not confident that much has really changed. 
Finally, for many, nothing has changed at all, and many are not interested in changing 
something they really don’t need or can afford. 
A summary of the recommendations identified in this chapter are listed below.  
1. Maintaining the status quo 
a. Conduct a local risk analysis 
2. Customization of NIMS 
 a. Creation of a small agency version of NIMS 
 b. Local modification of NIMS 
 c. Enhancement of regional incident management teams 
  d. Creation of a smart practices forum for NIMS customization 
3. Resource allocation 
 a. Regional expansion of the SMART concept. 
4. Program evaluation 
 a. Third-party program evaluation of NIMS 
b. Creation and voluntary implementation of objective NIMS proficiency 
standards through output/performance measurement 
c. Funding of incentives tied to objective standards 
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B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Maintaining the Status Quo 
Maintaining the status quo would not have been a serious consideration before the 
data in this report was obtained. However, this study produced significant feedback 
indicating that maintaining the status quo is appropriate for many. One insightful group 
of practitioners wondered about the real need for full commitment to NIMS:  
Perhaps what is needed is a rethinking of the functions of government and 
the increased use of non-profit and market-based organizations in the 
mitigation of the effects of disaster. Despite widespread claims to the 
contrary and the promise of politicians, governments cannot guarantee 
protections against disaster and catastrophe. (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 
2006, p. 21) 
Many feel that their present level of command and control has suited them well, 
and they do not see a compelling reason to prioritize additional preparedness as required 
by NIMS. They feel that there is little, if any, chance that they will be subject to medium- 
and large-scale critical incidents, or they feel strongly that their present level of education 
and experience in command and control will suffice. Before an agency leader decides on 
no further commitment—in other words before deciding to maintain the status quo—it is 
recommended that he facilitate or personally conduct a risk analysis identifying his 
community’s potential exposure to critical incidents. Even with seemingly minimal risks, 
a community will always be at risk for the most dangerous high-risk event—active 
shooters. Minimally, developing a well-practiced plan for at least this type of response 
should be an absolute priority.  
Recommendation 1: Conduct a local risk analysis  
Target: Wisconsin  law enforcement agencies 
Each Wisconsin law enforcement agency choosing to opt out of NIMS and ICS 
should at a minimum facilitate a risk analysis to identify potential vulnerabilities. This 
analysis should be used as a basis for considering the need to reevaluate one’s position on 
either partial or full NIMS or ICS adoption.  
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2. Customization of NIMS 
Make no mistake, NIMS sustainment is hard work. There is no substitution for the 
effort needed to gain and keep a high level of proficiency in this valuable system. There 
is a certain percentage of law enforcement personnel who are strong advocates for NIMS 
and know that practice and use will make NIMS a valuable tool for those who commit to 
that effort. There are others who just cannot or will not make that commitment. Buck, 
Trainor, and Aguirre emphasize this point in their analysis stating:  
Nevertheless, considering the difficulties regarding the implementation of 
this program at a national level, even if all involved desired it—and there 
are good reasons to doubt it—it is unlikely that the system will ever be 
fully implemented for all phases and actors in disasters. (2006, p. 21) 
If it is the case that the present system for one reason or another is too 
cumbersome to master, then a viable alternative is to customize NIMS and incident 
command, adopting just some of the core elements that fit the unique situations within 
each law enforcement community. Customization could sway those who lack the 
proficiency to recommit—or even better those who have not seriously considered 
adoption—to at least try to adopt the substantial core elements.  
The idea of turning form into function is nothing new. In Blue Ocean Strategy the 
authors point out, “Recognizing structure and boundaries exist only in managers’ minds, 
practitioners [should not] let existing structures limit their thinking” (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005, p. 211). One alternative is to shift the focus from the present product (NIMS) to a 
focus on adding value innovation, “that is, the creation of innovative value to unlock new 
demand” (p. 211). Federal, state and local officials need to recruit as many as possible 
who have opted out of NIMS or who see relatively low value in NIMS implementation. 
This would represent not a repackaging but a reformulation of the product, providing a 
much more flexible and adaptive product and addressing the argument that one size does 
not fit all. One way to visualize customization is to look at a strategy canvas.  
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a. A Strategy Canvas for Customization 
A strategy canvas was developed and used as a central tool in Blue Ocean 
Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25) and is shown below. This canvas is an 
interpretation based on the survey results and research for this thesis on factors that law 
enforcement consider when deciding on the level of NIMS commitment for their 
organization. The horizontal axis captures some of the important factors (defined below) 
that law enforcement might consider when deciding to implement any new program. For 
this canvas the vertical axis captures a perceived value or cost for the organization in 
time, resources, funding, and the level of benefit for each. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Strategy Canvas: NIMS Customization. 
The factors identified for this canvas are described: 
Initial training required. The mandatory attendance of ICS 100 through 
800 level courses. 
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Annual training costs and time. The cost and personnel time required for 
table top, functional and full scale ICS exercises and any on shift or monthly training in 
house. 
Ability to sustain NIMS. The ability to understand and exhibit the skills 
needed to carry out the core elements of ICS beyond the initial implementation period. 
Ability to be proficient. The organizations level of success in taking the 
initial lessons and institutionalizing NIMS and ICS into daily operations. 
Ease of use in the field. The level of ICS concepts and principals involved 
that influence a commander’s commitment to managing an incident and without draining 
resources in order to manage the ICS system. 
Confidence in use. The comfort and self-assurance level that supervisors 
possess in their ability to manage an incident using the ICS system. 
Commitment by leadership. The level of dedication to training and use by 
the organizations senior leadership and support provided to the membership. 
Stakeholder support. The level of political support provided by means of 
funding and training commitment.  
b. The Four Actions Framework for Customization of NIMS 
Several factors that can sway an organization’s interest have been 
identified in the canvas. What strategies are there, then, that can be implemented to 
achieve progress within those factors? Below is a framework (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, 
p. 29) that includes elements that either reduce, create, eliminate, or raise the value and 
cost to departments.  
Creating strategies to address each of the actions mentioned in the 
preceding chart can be difficult as the strategies may address several of the elements 
partially or entirely. The following recommendations address one or more of the elements 
listed above.  
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Recommendation 1: Creation of a small agency version of NIMS. 
Target: Federal government-FEMA. 
The federal government should concentrate on developing alternatives to 
full NIMS implementation. Considerations should be given to long-term incremental 
NIMS compliance and to developing guidelines to assist local agencies in customizing 
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Recommendation 2: Local modification of NIMS.  
Target: Wisconsin law enforcement agencies. 
Even without federal oversight or changes to the system, each  law 
enforcement agency should constitute a core group of local first responders and review 
the merits of customizing NIMS and ICS principles to accommodate their unique needs 
and resources. 
Recommendation 3: Enhancement of  regional incident management 
teams. 
Target: State, county and local governments. 
The State of Wisconsin Department of Emergency Management and the 
NIMS Advisory Council have been strong advocates for the establishment of at least 
some centralized IMTs strategically placed within regions of the state. This 
recommendation is not new as it has been and continues to be part of the overall State of 
Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy. Creation and adoption of IMTs is crucial to the 
long-term successful management of critical incidents in the state. The Milwaukee 
Wisconsin Urban Area Security Initiative in coordination with Wisconsin Emergency 
Management and the Waukesha County Technical College recently went so far as to 
create a comprehensive guide for the development of local/tribal incident management 
teams (Milwaukee Wisconsin Urban Area Security Initiative, 2009). This smart practice 
guide will serve as quality control for all efforts in the state. This concept is especially 
needed for those medium- and smaller-sized agencies without the resources to manage a 
long-term incident. This effort needs to be expedited, and initial and long-term training of 
these valuable teams needs to have strong political and financial support by all levels of 
government. This guide is an example of a successful effort of consolidation and 
collaboration during these times of growing budget deficits.  
Recommendation 4: Creation of a smart practices forum for NIMS 
customization. 
Target: Wisconsin emergency management. 
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Using the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information 
 Sharing Web site as a model, create a statewide law enforcement forum for sharing smart 
practices on how smaller agencies can successfully customize core elements of NIMS 
and ICS. 
3. Resource Allocation 
A repeated concern voiced by law enforcement administrators with ten or fewer 
officers is the inability to effectually implement ICS due to the limitations of adequate 
personnel. Each agency within the state of Wisconsin has access to mutual aid law 
enforcement through the Wisconsin Emergency Management–Police Services Program. 
This program dates back to 1961 and has been utilized intermittently since that time. One 
possible reason why it has not been regularly used is that “the requesting agency is 
responsible for the cost of the operation” (Wisconsin Emergency Management Web site). 
A recent example of the need for a large contingent of  law enforcement resources was 
the July, 2009 fire at the Patrick Cudahy meatpacking facility in Cudahy, Wisconsin. 
Cudahy police utilized a level eight SMART response and then requested assistance 
through the Emergency Police Services Program. In order to implement incident 
command and control in dangerously evolving events, agencies must have predetermined 
where they can access additional resources within the first critical hour of an event, as 
Cudahy did. A system like the SMART program provides such a prearrangement of 
staffing, as well as the all-important agreement to waive costs.  
Recommendation 1: Regional expansion of the SMART concept. 
Target: Wisconsin law enforcement agencies.  
Research the SMART concept for one’s region as a precursor to the umbrella 
program of WEM’s Emergency Police Service Program. 
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4. Program Evaluation 
The central idea behind a program is to “implement its plan. That is, it must 
actually carry out the intended functions in the intended way” (Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 
1999, p. 191). It is clear that the NIMS program has not delivered on its plan. The 
majority of large and medium-sized agencies in Wisconsin are probably NIMS 
compliant, but the plan is struggling with many influences, and it does not appear well 
enough conceived to deliver to the remaining  law enforcement organizations within the 
state.  
While this thesis has taken a first step in identifying discrepancies between the 
plan and the real-life effort to comply, the next step should be a complete assessment of 
the program implementation that includes “the program activities that actually take place 
and the services that are actually delivered in routine program operation. Program 
monitoring and related procedures are a means by which the evaluator investigates these 
issues” (p. 191). The basic academic process should be focused on answering one or 
more of the following basic functions:  
a) Whether a program is reaching the appropriate target population,  
b) Whether its service delivery and support functions are consistent with program 
design specifications or other appropriate standards,  
c) Whether positive changes appear among the program participants and social 
conditions the program addresses (p. 191). 
The data contained within this thesis seem to confirm that in answer to function 
a), the program has not in fact done an adequate job of reaching the target population, 
unless the true or announced target population is actually only the large and medium-
sized agencies.  
In response to function b), it seems that great strides to provide substantial 
training and support to secure implementation of NIMS and ICS have occurred, but those 
support functions have not been flexible enough to adjust and address the several barriers 
that have developed along the way. To their credit FEMA and the National Emergency 
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Managers Association have taken the time to identify barriers to NIMS compliance, but 
no revision of the plan has been formulated to address those barriers.  
In response to function c), the answer is mixed. Over the course of the past three 
years since NIMS compliance was announced, there have been some remarkable 
accomplishments within some  law enforcement organizations. There is also strong 
evidence that there have been no positive changes; in some other cases, there has been an 
actual step back or a negative impact upon organizations because of their failed attempts 
at compliance.  
Recommendation 1: Third-party program evaluation of NIMS.  
Target: Federal government. 
Create, by presidential directive, an evaluation of the NIMS program, to be 
carried out by an impartial, third-party, non-governmental unit. 
Recommendation 2: Creation and voluntary implementation of objective NIMS 
proficiency standards through output/performance measurement.  
Target: Federal, state and local government. 
While an objective evaluation of the NIMS plan should be done, each level of 
government and each law enforcement agency should look internally for ways to evaluate 
their performance of and proficiency in NIMS and ICS. Even without being mandated, 
local leadership should institute objective standards through the establishment of specific 
organizational goals and objectives. Leadership should also consider establishing 
individual officers’ goals and objectives by utilizing the yearly individual evaluation 
process. (Powell, 2006, p. 106) indicates that output or performance measures serve to 
indicate what was accomplished as a result of some programmatic activity. Powell states 
that such measures focus on output and effectiveness rather than merely on input. 
Presently performance measurement is lacking, and the citizens and local leadership do 
not get a true indication of their employees’ proficiency. 
Recommendation 3: Funding of incentives tied to objective standards. 
Target: Federal and state governments. 
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Create an incentives program that will reimburse agencies with additional funding 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The movement towards the incident command system has existed for fifteen 
years. The mandates of NIMS have only come in the last few years, and this is therefore 
largely new territory. This thesis has attempted to locate the principal gaps between law 
enforcement and compliance with the present form of NIMS. Further research 
highlighting the appropriate elements of a NIMS version specifically for smaller agencies 
would benefit a majority of law enforcement agencies in the country. Additional research 
toward establishing an objective output performance evaluation system to measure 
proficiency is also warranted.  
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